As today is the anniversary of the Battle of Bosworth Field. One of the most pivotal battles in English history. English history and subsequently British could have been very different if Richard III rather Henry Tudor had been victorious. The political and religious upheavals of the 16th and 17th centuries would probably have been very different and indeed may not have happened. We will never know.
As for the battle arguably Richard's biggest error was to trust the Stanleys.
https://richardiii.net/richard-iii-his-world/the-war-of-the-roses/the-battles/the-battle-of-bosworth/
The Battle of Bosworthby Mike Ingram
22nd August 1485Result of the Battle – Lancastrian victory
In any account of the Battle of Bosworth, it is essential to study the contemporary sources. It can be a minefield. Although they are few, comparing one to another alongside the landscape is essential. Equally it is key to look at each version of each source. The prime Tudor source for the battle is Polydore Vergil, but even that comes in several versions and the first manuscript version has some significant and important differences to the later ones, which suggest accounts of the battle were heavily ‘sanitised’ to suit the Tudor narrative, for example, involvement of the French is almost entirely ignored. The Stanley poems are also frequently ignored despite being the only account which gives any description of the landscape which completely matches the archaeology of the rediscovered battlefield. We therefore have to look more closely at the European sources which not only add considerable detail to the narrative but also show the battle.
The parallels with what had happened in England and what was happening in France was uncanny. Like England, they had a boy king (Charles VIII). Like with the Woodvilles in England, they had a powerful family controlling the king, namely the new king’s older sister Anne of Beaujeu. And, in Louis d’Orléans, the French had a popular potential leader of the royal council, a position not unlike the Protector in England. However, Anne of Beaujeu, who had been informed of what had happened in England by Mancini, was determined not to let Charles slip from her grasp.
France was under threat. Internally from Louis d’Orléans, Prince of the Blood, and from England, Burgundy and Brittany who had all formed an alliance. As part of England’s alliance with Brittany, Richard III demanded the surrender of Henry Tudor. However, at the last moment Henry escaped to France followed by his supporters. According to Molinet, when Henry finally reached Montargis calling himself King of England, he was received with great joy and was well loved and looked after. However, he added that it was all show and was more to irritate Richard than in deference to Henry. First Louis d’Orléans was arrested and his rebellion suppressed. Brittany was then invaded by dissidents with French support, and finally the French turned their attention to England.
At the beginning of May 1485, Anne of Beaujeu finally offered Henry Tudor the support he needed to mount an invasion. In addition to his own men made up of 400–500 fugitives, Henry was given a unit of between 1,000 and 4,000 French troops (depending on the source). Commines says that Charles ‘paid for the passage of 3000 or 4000 men’, and ‘some pieces of artillery, and sent him out of Normandy to land in some part of Wales.’ Scottish chronicler John Major writing in 1521, suggests that there were 5,000 men of which 1,000 were Scottish. Another Scot, Robert Lindsay of Pitscottie, in his
Scottish Chronicle written sometime before 1585, says that there were 3,000 English, 6,000 French and 1,000 men-at-arms ‘called the Scots company’, sailing from Harfleur in 30 ships. Vergil on the other hand says that there were 2,000 armed men and noted in the manuscript version that they were partly English and partly French. A letter from Diego de Valera also says that Charles granted Henry ‘two thousand combatants’. The normally reliable Molinet says that at first, 1,800 men were assembled for the expedition and another 1,800 was mustered at Honfleur just before they sailed. Command was given to Philbert de Chandée, a nobleman from Savoy, and described by Henry as ‘our dear kinsman, both of spirit and blood’. Bernard André, Henry’s biographer, described him as a man renowned for his military skill. Henry was to knight him once they arrived in England and on 6 January 1486 created him Earl of Bath. It is possible that he was in overall command of the whole army, not just the French. Something that the Tudor chroniclers would be loathed to admit to.
Henry and his army landed in Milford Haven at Mill Bay in Milford Sound, close to Dale on 7 August 1485. Over the next 14 days, they would march around 225 miles, averaging 16 miles (26 km) each day, gathering support and men as they went. Henry crossed into England at Shrewsbury after one of Sir William Stanley’s men negotiated the opening of the gates. Richard III began to assemble his army at Nottingham and Henry’s route suggests he was making a beeline straight for him. On 19 August Henry had reached Stafford, where he met Sir William Stanley who was going to act as Henry’s rearguard for the rest of the journey. However, when Richard moved from Nottingham to Leicester, Henry’s army turned south towards Lichfield, meeting up with Lord Thomas Stanley (his step-father) at Atherstone.
On 21 August, having been informed of Henry’s location by his couriers, battle standards unfurled and ready to fight, Richard and his army marched out of Leicester, according to tradition through the West Gate and over Bow Bridge. As recounted in Michael Jones’ book
Bosworth 1485: Psychology of a Battle, there is tantalising evidence that an advance guard from Richard’s army clashed with Stanley’s men whilst at Atherstone. There are records of five men being killed on 20th or 21st August. Some form of clash before the main battle is also suggested by
The Song of Ladye Bessiye.
Dawn came at 05:00 on 22nd August. Before setting out Henry sent Sir Reginald Bray to meet with Lord Thomas Stanley again, asking him to take command of his van. Stanley refused. According to Vergil he told Henry that “the Earl should set his own forces in order while he would come with his array well appointed”. Vergil continues saying that it was not what Henry wanted to hear and “to that which the oportunytie of time and weight of cause requyryd, thowghe Henry wer no lyttle vexyd, and began to be soomwhat appallyd, yeat withowt lingering he of necessytie orderyd his men in this sort”. According to the
Ballad of Bosworth Field, Stanley then lends Henry four of his best knights, Sir Robert Tunstall, Sir John Savage, Sir Hugh Persall and Sir Humphrey Stanley along with their retinues. However, we have a variation in accounts here, as Vergil says that Savage had joined the Tudor army the previous day. Henry then probably gathered his army at Witherley, as it was here that Henry knighted his standard bearer William Brandon and several other followers.
The Battlefield
The area where the two sides met was centred on Fenn Lane, the Roman road to Leicester, and 3.6 kilometres (2.25 miles) north of the major Roman road of Watling Street. It was also at the junction of the boundaries of the medieval villages of Dadlington, Stoke Golding, Upton and Shenton and 3 kilometres (1.86 miles) south-west of Ambion Hill. The ground was a flat plain, mainly comprising of fenland which is crossed by streams, with an area of peat marsh, known as Fen Hole south of the road.
South of this marsh, the ground gently rises 20 metres (65 ft) to a ridge, that overlooks the road. On the top of the ridge is the village of Stoke Golding and approximately 600 metres (650 yards) further north east is the village of Dadlington. The ridge continues north east towards Sutton Cheney with a westerly facing spur now known as Ambion Hill creating a shallow valley enclosed on three sides, before falling 30 metres (98 ft) back into the plain and the battlefield. Another important consideration is the medieval ridge and furrow field system. Surviving ridges are parallel, ranging from 3 to 22 yards (3 to 20 m) apart and up to 24 inches (61 cm) tall – but could be up to six feet high (1.8 m) in places. Research on the three battlefields of Northamptonshire (Edgcote, Northampton and Naseby) by the Northamptonshire Battlefields Society and the Naseby Battlefields Project suggests that battles all took place along the line of the ridge and furrow and not across it. Trying to cross them would have constituted a considerable obstacle and horses would have likely refused. At Bosworth, the ridge and furrow is, for the most part, 90 degrees to Fenn Lane, including down from the ridge. A separate strip also leads from the battlefield on to Crown Hill. Their identification, therefore, points to the direction of troop movements.
Map of the Battlefield, Courtesy of Helion & Company.
Deployment
We do not know how many men faced each other that day. Medieval chroniclers always appear to be wildly inaccurate when estimating how many men fought in a battle. Molinet puts Richard’s army as having 60,000 men and the
Ballad of Bosworth Field says 40,000. Only Vergil gives the size of Henry’s army, which he puts at 5,000 men and continues that Richard had at least twice as many. The confused Castilian Report says that Richard’s vanguard had both 7,000 and 10,000 men at different points, and Molinet says it was 11,000 or 12,000. The length of the line of battlefield debris found during the recent investigations is around 914 metres (1000 yards), so the two vanguards must have been at least this long. Assuming that there were no gaps in the vanguards and that men require a metre of space each when fighting side by side then we can estimate that there were around a thousand men in the front line of the two vanguards. Given that, the Duke of Norfolk would have at least two or three ranks of archers and at least three ranks of infantry and knights, there must have been a minimum 5,000 men in the vanguard. However, the vanguard could easily have been ten ranks deep, given that the Royal yeoman archers alone had raised 3,000 men in the past. Which means that 10,000 men is not outside the realms of possibility. No one gives the number of men in Richard’s battle, but in all probability, it was comparatively small, as the majority of his archers were in the vanguard. Molinet alone gives the number of troops under the Earl of Northumberland which he says was 10,000 men, which is probably too high. We can therefore estimate that Richard’s army had between 10 and 15,000 men in total.
In working out the most likely way the sides deployed, we must return to the sources. We hear from Polydore Vergil that: “There was a marsh betwixt both hosts, which Henry of purpose left on the right hand, that it might serve his men instead of a fortress, by the doing thereof also he left the sun upon his back.”
The find of the gilt boar on the edge of the marsh and Vergil’s statement confirms the location of Henry’s right flank. The archaeological survey found a line of battlefield debris, including a broken sword hilt almost parallel to the road, which suggests that the battle, and therefore Henry’s line, was west to east. This of course does not make any sense, that is until we look at Molinet who says that the French were not part of the main army and that:
“The
Ballad of Bosworth Field tells us that the Stanleys withdrew to a mountain where they looked across the plain and could not see the ground for men and horses. In medieval times any high ground was called a mountain. The only high ground is where the land rises towards Stoke Golding behind and to the left of Henry’s army. This becomes significant when in another part of the ballad we hear that as the two sides came together:
‘King Richard looked on the mountaines hye,
& sayd, “I see the banner of the Lord Stanley.’
The French also made their preparations marching against the English, being in the field a quarter league away…knowing by the king’s shot the lie of the land and the order of his battle, resolved, in order to avoid the fire, to mass their troops against the flank rather than the front of the king’s battle.”
It is likely that the Stanleys, who, having arrived first, had already assumed a blocking position on the rising ground overlooking the road. And, whoever controlled the high ground, controlled the road. If we position William Stanley in the area around Crown Hill and Thomas Stanley further east near Stoke Golding, or behind his brother, together they could have blocked Richard’s army from moving towards Watling Street or threatened his flank if moving along Fenn Lane. If this is the case and they were in position before Richard arrived, then Richard would have had no alternative but to form up in front of the Stanleys, parallel to the road. It could be that it is this position to which Vergil refers when he says “…Thomas Stanley, who was now approchyd the place of fight, as in the mydde way betwixt the two battaylles, that he wold coom to with his forces, to sett the soldiers in array”, because it would have been close to half way between the two armies before they set out. With Henry’s main army approaching from the west and the Stanleys in front of him, Richard had been caught in a trap.
We are then told by Vergil that Henry: “made a sclender vanward for the smaule number of his people; before the same he placyd archers, of whom he made captane John erle of Oxfoord; in the right wing of the vanward hplacyd Gilbert Talbot to defend the same; in the left verily he sat John Savage.”
Vergil also suggests that Henry’s battle-line was originally deployed south of the marsh, but advanced to contact “whan the king saw thenemyes passyd the marishe, he commandyd his soldiers to geave charge uppon them.”
On the other side, Molinet tells us that: “King Richard prepared his ‘battles’, where there was a vanguard and a rearguard; he had around 60,000 combatants and a great number of cannons. The leader of the vanguard was Lord John Howard…Another lord, Brackenbury, captain of the Tower of London, was also in command of the van, which had 11,000 or 12,000 men altogether.” We therefore have Norfolk in command of the first line, probably with his son Thomas, Earl of Surrey, and Lord Brackenbury. Thomas had served a two year military apprenticeship in Burgundy under Charles the Bold from 1466-68 at the request of Edward IV, then fought beside him at Barnet, so like his father, was an experienced commander. It must have been an impressive sight as Vergil describes the vanguard as: “stretching yt furth of a woonderfull lenght, so full replenyshyd both with foote men and horsemen that to the beholders afar of yt gave a terror for the multitude, and in the front wer placyd his archers, lyke a most strong trenche and bulwark”.
Behind the vanguard was Richard and “a choice force of soldiers”. This was no doubt his bodyguard, household troops, and personal retainers. Behind them was the Earl of Northumberland with what the Crowland Chronicler describes as a large company of reasonably good men. If Norfolk had all the archers and best infantry in the first line, and Richard was in the second line with his household, then Northumberland probably commanded the troops raised by Commission of Array. These were in effect raw recruits and would have had little or no experience of war. Vergil suggests that many would have changed sides or fled before the battle had even started, had it not been for Richard’s scurriers (light cavalry) preventing them. Richard’s array was therefore textbook Vegetius, used many times before both in England and Europe. A number of historians have suggested that Richard’s three battles were in a line, side by side, with Northumberland on the right. It has also been suggested that the reason that Northumberland does not get involved is because he is pinned in place by the Stanleys. Neither is likely because firstly, to get to Henry, we are told that Richard has to move past both vanguards. We have already seen that the vanguard contained archers and foot. There is no mention of him passing Northumberland. Secondly, we are told that Northumberland should have charged the French. This would have been impossible if he was on the opposite flank.
The
Ballad of Bosworth Field hints at Richard’s deployment of his guns when it says:
“They had 7 score Serpentines without dout,
that locked & Chained vppon a row”
Why chain the guns together if they are in the centre of a line? The chains would certainly hamper any movement of the infantry. If they were on the flank however, in enfilade, they could rake Henry’s lines with cannon fire and cause maximum destruction to his ranks. They would also create an effective barrier, protecting that flank against attack. They would also potentially be in danger of being dragged off, so it would makes sense to chain them together. There is also some evidence to support this theory, as small groups of cannon balls were found close to the road, just where you would expect the guns to be positioned. Having established the approximate positions of the battle lines, by examining the pattern of finds of cannon balls we can estimate the positions of artillery. The natural target for the guns would be the centre of line, so with this in mind, cones of fire emanating from Richard’s and Henry’s left flanks can be traced. In both cases, this would place them close to the roads. And, as guns were heavy and difficult to move across country, it would only be natural to place them as close to the road as possible. This also is supported by Molinet’s comment about the French attack on Richard’s right flank; from here, they would have been out sight of the guns and their line of fire.
It seems that Henry must have advanced on Richard first, as the Crowland Chronicler says that “the earl of Richmond with his men proceeded directly against King Richard.”
Then, according to Vergil, when Richard saw Henry’s army passing the marsh: “… he commandyd his soldiers to geave charge uppon them. They making suddanely great showtes assaultyd the enemy first with arrowes, who wer nothing faynt unto the fyght but began also to shoote fearcely; but whan they cam to hand strokes the matter than was delt with blades.”
The two sides then disengaged. After how long and why, is not clear from the texts. Vergil continues:
“fearing lest hys men in fyghting might be envyronyd of the multitude, commandyd in every rang that no soldiers should go above tenfoote from the standerds; … whan all men had throng thik togethers, and stayd a whyle from fighting, thadversaryes werther with a ferd, supposing soom fraude, and so they all forbore the fight a certane space … Than therle of Oxforth in one part, and others in an other part with the bandes of men closse one to an other, gave freshe charge uppon thenemy, and in array tryangle vehemently renewyd the conflict.”
Here, Vergil’s original expression is
Facto cuneo, which although is often read as a wedge, could also be read as a column. What is also important here is the line ‘the others in an other part made a wedge and simultaneously pressed on and renewed the battle.’ What he is more probably saying is that although Oxford’s men renewed their attack, it was a separate formation that attacked in a wedge or column. This must surely mean the French, who had been waiting some distance away for this moment.
The only way they could have been stopped was either with the artillery, which was on the opposite flank, or the archers and hand gunners; but these were engaged in hand-to-hand fighting to their front. A third option would have been to charge them with Richard’s cavalry, however, against the pikes, the chances of success were slim. The French were, in effect unstoppable and Richard had been out manoeuvred.
And where was Northumberland whilst the battle was raging? The Crowland Chronicler wrote that: “In the place where the Earl of Northumberland was posted, with a large company of reasonably good men, no engagement could be discerned, and no battle blows given or received”. Molinet also adds: “The Earl of Northumberland…ought to have charged the French, but did nothing except to flee, both he and his company, to abandon his King Richard”. Was it his men in the third battle that the chroniclers refer to as traitors? Northumberland was arrested and spent a short period in captivity after the battle, so it is unlikely that he had struck a deal with Henry. It is much more probable that seeing the French flank attack and the collapse of Norfolk’s line or when Richard was killed, these raw recruits panicked. Deciding that they did not want to suffer the same fate, they simply ran.
The situation must have been dire. Norfolk’s vanguard was collapsing and Northumberland’s men were fleeing. Vergil says that:
“king Richard might have sowght to save himself by flight; for they who wer abowt him, seing the soldiers even from the first stroke to lyft up ther weapons febly and fayntlye, and soome of them to depart the feild pryvyly”
This is echoed by the
Ballad of Bosworth Field, which says:
“then to King Richard there came a Knight,
and said, “I hold itt time ffor to fflee;
ffor yonder stanleys dints they be soe wight,
against them no man may dree”
The
Ballad of Bessie repeats much of the
Ballad of Bosworth Field except it claims the knight to be Sir William Harrington. The Castilian Report is even more specific, for it says:
“Now when Salaçar, your little vassal, who was there in King Richard’s service, saw the treason of the king’s people, he went up to him and said: “Sire, take steps to put your person in safety, without expecting to have the victory in today’s battle, owing to the manifest treason in your following”.
The report then says Richard replied “Salazar, God forbid I yield one step. This day I will die as king or win”.
By forming his men into wedges, Oxford had created gaps in his line. And it was through one of these gaps that Henry’s standard was spotted close to the marsh. Richard saw that it was Henry himself with a small body of mounted knights and infantry. If he could just reach Henry and kill him, then the battle would be over. So, Richard gathered his household cavalry and infantry around him and launched the last charge of the Plantagenets.
We do not know which route the charge took, however, the ground to the east of the marsh was boggy. Also, at least one stream had to be negotiated which would slow the impetus of any charge to a trot. And then there were the Stanleys, they had still not committed and could block the cavalry before it reached Henry if they went east of the marsh. Speed was of the essence, so they must have taken the shortest route – through the gaps in Oxford’s line, west of the marsh. Vergil supports this when he says: “he strick his horse with the spurres, and runneth owt of thone syde withowt the vanwardes agaynst him”. Beaumont’s poem says they charged uphill, which makes sense, as behind Henry was the high ground.
Gathering momentum, Richard and his supporters’ crash into Henry’s bodyguard. Richard kills William Brandon, Henry’s standard bearer and the standard falls to the ground only to be picked up by a Welshman, Rhys Fawr. Henry must have been close, because we are told by Vergil that next in Richard’s path is: “…John Cheney a man of muche fortytude, far exceeding the common sort, who encountered with him as he cam, but the king with great force drove him to the ground, making way with weapon on every side”.
Richard’s personal standard bearer, Sir Percival Thirwall, is also unhorsed and his legs cut from under him. As Henry’s men begin to buckle under the weight of the charge, up to 3,000 fresh troops charge down from the hill into Richard’s cavalry and infantry who were still trying to fight their way through to Henry. The
Rose of England says that:
“And then came in the harts head;
A worthy sight it was to see,
The jacketts that were of white and redd,
How they laid about them lustilye.’
The Ballad of Bosworth Fielde only says that:
Downe att a backe then cometh hee,
And shortlye sett upon the Kinge.”
There is a slight variation in the ‘Harley 542’ version of the ballad as it says at a ‘banke’ not ‘backe.’ Both suggest that they came off the high ground. Both also suggest that the final stages of the battle took place close to the marsh.
One by one, Richard’s followers were cut down in the melee that followed. Then Richard was killed. Exactly where Richard died is not known although a proclamation by Henry soon after the battle says it was at a place known as Sandeford. Where this was has been lost in time although it was most likely south of the marsh at a crossing point on one of the streams that fed the marsh. According to Vergil, he was “killyd fyghting manfully in the thickkest presse of his enemyes”. Molinet, on the other hand writes that “His horse leapt into a marsh from which it could not retrieve itself”. Richard’s courage during his last moments is unquestionable. Even his detractors are in agreement on this, as John Rous says, he “bore himself like a gallant knight and acted with distinction as his own champion until his last breath”. And the Crowland Chronicler writes that “King Richard fell in the field, struck by many mortal wounds, as a bold and most valiant prince”.
The
Ballad of Ladye Bessiye describes Richard’s death in horrific detail saying:
“They beat his bassnet to his head,
Untill the braine came out with blood;
They never left him till he was dead.”
So too does Guto’r Glyn’s poem of around 1493 which says, “killed the boar, shaved his head.”
The discovery of Richard’s remains in Leicester allowed scientists and weapons specialists to discover the probable cause of Richard’s death with modern forensic techniques, such as conventional CT and micro-CT scanning. A total of eight separate wounds were found on Richard’s skull, suggesting a frenzied attack possibly by more than one person. Although all were perimortem (before death) it is impossible to say in which order they took place because they were all distinct, without any overlap. However, the majority could have only occurred after his helmet had been removed.
Who actually killed Richard is confused as a number of those present claimed credit. And in the confused heat of battle, it could have been any one of Henry’s bodyguards or Stanley’s men. Molinet only says “One of the Welshmen then came after him, and struck him dead with a halberd”.
A large proportion of William’s men would have come from North Wales, so it could have been any one of them. The Denbighshire poet Tudur Aled claimed that it was Rhys ap Maredudd after he recovered Henry’s standard. In another version of events the poet Guto’r Glyn implies that Rhys ap Thomas was responsible for killing Richard, although it is unlikely as he would have not carried a halberd, but possibly could have had a poleaxe. Instead, this may only mean that one of Rhys ap Thomas’ Welsh halberdiers killed the king, possibly, according to some traditions, Wyllyam Gardynyr. Another version is that it was Ralph of Rudyard, which is near the Stanley heartlands of Leek in Staffordshire, that dealt the fatal blow. Another claimant is Thomas Woodshawe, a tenant from Middleton Hall, near Tamworth. He was made bailiff and keeper of the park of Berkeswell in Warwickshire soon after in recognition for something. It is also worth noting at this point that the halberd was neither an English or Welsh weapon, so Molinet might have been using a generic term for a pole arm.
With Richard’s death, any remaining resistance quickly ended. The battle had lasted more than two hours. The cream of the Yorkist nobility were lying dead on the field including Norfolk, Lord Ferrers, Sir Richard Ratcliffe, Sir Robert Percy, Sir Robert Brackenbury, Sir John Sacheverell, and John Kendall. Many of Richard’s men threw down their weapons and surrendered or were taken prisoner. Those who had not surrendered or had been captured were hunted down like animals as the rout began. Many would have been hacked down from behind as they ran. There is archaeological evidence to support this in the form of a trail of battlefield debris heading north east away from the battle site, and towards Ambion Hill. Some of the fugitives may have reached Dadlington Mill, well over a thousand yards away, as a livery badge of an eagle with wings, probably once owned by a member of John, Lord Zouche’s household was recently found close by. It may have been in this area that the remains of the Royal army made its last stand and where Zouche was captured. Some, such as Lord Lovell and the Stafford brothers, managed to escape completely and to reach sanctuary at St John’s in Colchester. Catesby was not so lucky, he was captured either at the battle or soon after, and executed three days later along with two yeomen named Bracher from the West Country. These were the only three to be executed after the battle. In his will, made on the 25th, Catesby cryptically asks the Stanleys to pray for his soul as they had not for his body as he trusted in them. It reads as if Catesby had surrendered to the Stanleys, who had promised him protection, but then reneged and handed him over for execution. He may have been referring to an earlier deal as well, although exactly what he really meant will probably be never known.
On Henry’s side the only notable casualty was William Brandon. We do not know who else died that day. Vergil puts the numbers of dead as 1,000 from Richard’s army and scarcely 100 from Henry’s. Molinet says only 300 on either side whilst the Castilian Report says 10,000 in total. The truth probably lies somewhere in between. With the battle over, the victors looted Richard’s baggage train. Richard’s royal regalia was collected by Henry’s officers and loaded onto his baggage train. William Stanley was offered the pick of the rest, and took a set of Richard’s tapestries which he proudly displayed at one of his residences and Henry’s mother was sent his personal prayer book.
According to Vergil, with the battle over, Henry gave thanks to God for his victory and withdrew to the nearest hill. From here he thanked his commanders and nobles, knighted Gilbert Talbot, Rhys ap Thomas and Humphrey Stanley and gave orders that all the dead should be given an honourable burial. Thomas Stanley then crowned him Henry VII with Richard’s own crown, which according to tradition was found under a thorn bush close to where Richard was killed. We do not know how true this story is, although Henry did take the image of a crown and thorn bush as one of his badges soon after. As to the site of this momentous event, part of the high ground behind Henry’s battle line, originally known as Garbrody’s Hill and Garbrod Field in the fifteenth century was changed to Crown Hill and Crown Field before 1605, no doubt in reference to the event.
Richard’s body was recovered from the battlefield. According to Vergil, it was “…nakyd of all clothing, and layd uppon an horse bake with the armes and legges hanginge downe on both sides”. The scene was described by the Crowland Chronicler as a “miserable spectacle in good sooth”. His body was then taken back to Leicester. Hall says that he was on the horse of his Blanc Sanglier Pursuivant, an officer of arms, ranking below a herald but having similar duties, but the
Great Chronicle of London says it was a Pursuivant called Norroy. John Moore was the Norroy King of Arms, a senior herald with jurisdiction north of the River Trent (Nottingham) and his son was at some point Blanc Sanglier, so it could have been either.
Mike Ingram is the author of Richard III and the Battle of Bosworth, published by Helion & Company, 2019
