10 minutes ago, NestorGarde said:

Agreed. But we as fans have a tendency to get too hung up on transfer fees, it's the contracts (salaries) which are the most costly. Deivid Washington costs the club A LOT less than Maigan would.

BlueCo don't exactly cover themselves in glory on their contract negotiations either, if you take the Capology figures at face value

Where data exists for the players they have signed, and I'm going to exclude Sterling and Nkunku who were established players and were brought in with very similar salaries to what they were on at Man City and Leipzig respectively, they have awarded pay rises to switch clubs that are 4x or 5x previous earnings on the bottom line. Insanely generous for inexperienced players, and a big part of the problem as to why we can't now find buyers to match those salaries for players we've now decided we want to move on.

On a lighter note I can’t wait for the CWC, at least we can all put our calculators down🙄

54 minutes ago, Ukraine Bolt said:

You do realise i didn't start this thread, right? Or should i not comment on threads other people create?

Which one do you know? Next time you're round for a cuppa tell him to do better. Generous isn't a trait i'd look for to run a football club but i guess it makes sense why we're throwing tens of millions to clubs for kids worth a fraction of that. Charity FC

You made up numbers to spin them as slight losses.

Werner were shocking transfers. They were however bought with the intention of improving the squad, not to flip for a profit.

You've admitted you're a shill for the club because you're mates with a director so i don't really see the point on moving on with this conversation.

I am perfectly aware that you dint start the thread. I said that you took the of thread title wade in with negativity.

As for which director I certainly am not going to identify which one but again you are not reading what was said. I certainly didn’t say I was his mate but again you join up the dots incorrectly.

Was Sanchez bought to improve the squad ( to be fair I don’t think he has) what about Cucerella or what about Cacedio, how about Enzo or Palmer? Then let’s talk abut Neto or Tosin or how about Nunkuku and maybe even Fernandez. Do you really believe any of these were purchased without the intention of improving the squad?

1 hour ago, Ukraine Bolt said:

Walking away from Gittens is fine, overpriced.

Walking away from Maignan if we are going to use Petrovic is fine. (a few million is a drop in the ocean, we spent more on Deivid Washington.

Walking away from Maignan, to then not take Petrovic to the CWC and are looking to sell him, is bat sh*t crazy.

Have we walked away from Gittens or Maignan? Think you have missed the reason why the club in the first mini window didn’t sign the players. Will they sign ? Who knows at this point in time

Petrovic made the call not to go to the club WC . He created a major issue when he sold his IR but when a player says he wants to be guaranteed a starter which seems to be the case what would you do?

It's not really about the money, it's the quality and type of player plus the urgency of which we do deals.

Delap is fine. The surplus of similar players and overstocking of young players is ridiculous

For what it's worth I do believe the club will end up in a overall profit when all these young players we have bought are moved on, I'm just not sure the profit gained would be worth all this hassle.

From their perspective though if we come across enough world class talents like a Palmer then it's probably been all worth it.

I think they are improving, slightly, and I expect further improvement will happen in the coming years.

They are now limited in their spending whereas previously we appear to have had a very high ceiling. Also past and current failings will also make eghbahi a little more cautious.

I believe reality is becoming apparent, in that every deal isn't guaranteed to make profit and a low purchase price is as important with players as it is in any marketplace.

Coupled with Eghbali will be looking for more than the odd couple of million profit given we have to pay wages or indeed tie up funds.

They are amateurs but I think they have the ability to learn.

I am pretty sure that bluefish’s a framework but the fact we would ditch samu for felix is completely down to directors.. Egbhali and Ted have a day job too.. they are not sitting and deciding that we pay 20 mil for Devid..

yes owners are to be blamed for putting two directors and the framework but which players and how much is definitely the directors ..

6 hours ago, NestorGarde said:

Agreed. But we as fans have a tendency to get too hung up on transfer fees, it's the contracts (salaries) which are the most costly. Deivid Washington costs the club A LOT less than Maigan would.

We have a very strict wage cap at the club, actually one of the good things this ownership have done. We would have been paying him in line with what a first team GK should be paid.

5 hours ago, terraloon said:

I am perfectly aware that you dint start the thread. I said that you took the of thread title wade in with negativity.

As for which director I certainly am not going to identify which one but again you are not reading what was said. I certainly didn’t say I was his mate but again you join up the dots incorrectly.

Was Sanchez bought to improve the squad ( to be fair I don’t think he has) what about Cucerella or what about Cacedio, how about Enzo or Palmer? Then let’s talk abut Neto or Tosin or how about Nunkuku and maybe even Fernandez. Do you really believe any of these were purchased without the intention of improving the squad?

Have we walked away from Gittens or Maignan? Think you have missed the reason why the club in the first mini window didn’t sign the players. Will they sign ? Who knows at this point in time

Petrovic made the call not to go to the club WC . He created a major issue when he sold his IR but when a player says he wants to be guaranteed a starter which seems to be the case what would you do?

Breaking news: man speaks in thread about the topic of the thread.

"Do you actually know any of the directors? I do .The person in question isn’t diabolical he is an incredibly intelligent and generous person. One thing he ain’t is diabolical." So are you his mate or have you just watched one of his public speeches at an awards night and pretended to know him?

Sanchez - 27M for Brighton third choice GK in the last year of his contract.

Cucurella - Massively overpaid.

Caicedo - Agreed a deal at 70M then pissed about and got gambled up to an almost record fee. Turned into a great player but paid more than we needed to.

Enzo - status symbol post-WC. Massively overpaid.

Palmer - Youth acquisition gamble. Good deal now.

Most of these prove the people have no idea how to negotiate a deal. Palmer was the only one that was a good deal and even that looked like we massively overpaid for our third choice attacker on the last day of the window.

I pray they've walked away from Gittens. Maignan deal depends on Petrovic.

Yes - we should have made Petrovic number one. We publically made Sanchez number one after a year of cluster f**ks so why would we not back a player that's gone on loan and proved himself as the number one keeper in the league. Courtois came back in a similar fashion and Jose made him number one over the greatest GK in premier league history. If Clearlake was in charge back then i'm sure Courtois would have been sold on for a quick buck.

7 hours ago, WhiteWall said:

Herein lies the pin to our balloon of financial portfolio management. for example, Omari Kellyman is worth fck all squared.

That was strictly PSR move. I would not think its the end

28 minutes ago, Ukraine Bolt said:

Breaking news: man speaks in thread about the topic of the thread.

"Do you actually know any of the directors? I do .The person in question isn’t diabolical he is an incredibly intelligent and generous person. One thing he ain’t is diabolical." So are you his mate or have you just watched one of his public speeches at an awards night and pretended to know him?

Sanchez - 27M for Brighton third choice GK in the last year of his contract.

Cucurella - Massively overpaid.

Caicedo - Agreed a deal at 70M then pissed about and got gambled up to an almost record fee. Turned into a great player but paid more than we needed to.

Enzo - status symbol post-WC. Massively overpaid.

Palmer - Youth acquisition gamble. Good deal now.

Most of these prove the people have no idea how to negotiate a deal. Palmer was the only one that was a good deal and even that looked like we massively overpaid for our third choice attacker on the last day of the window.

I pray they've walked away from Gittens. Maignan deal depends on Petrovic.

Yes - we should have made Petrovic number one. We publically made Sanchez number one after a year of cluster f**ks so why would we not back a player that's gone on loan and proved himself as the number one keeper in the league. Courtois came back in a similar fashion and Jose made him number one over the greatest GK in premier league history. If Clearlake was in charge back then i'm sure Courtois would have been sold on for a quick buck.

Chelsea's transition out of the Abramovich period was never going to be an iteration of the past. The team left in Clearlake's wake was bloated, splintered, and full of players whose value had leveled off or decreased. Older stalwarts such as César Azpilicueta, Jorginho, and Aubameyang embodied the remnants of a short-term paradigm, while young hopefuls such as Pulisic and Ziyech had failed to become the high-end contributors projected of them. They were high-paid on long contracts to boot, making it hard to shift them on. In this context, the new ownership group was tasked with revitalizing the roster, reducing the average age, and building for sustainable futures along the way. The resulting strategy was one resembling a classical venture capital strategy—high initial investment in undervalued or developing assets, emphasizing long-term upside, and tolerance of near-term volatility. At the heart of this strategy is Chelsea’s creative use of amortized contracts to avoid violating Financial Fair Play rules. In signing players to seven- or eight-year contracts, the club was able to amortize the high cost of transfer fees over numerous seasons in its accounts. The case of Enzo Fernández’s £106 million transfer is commonly referred to as an overpay. When translated to annual cost in accounts terms, he is closer to costing the club around £12.5 million—a figure well within the club’s model. The same reasoning can be used with regard to the £115 million spent on Moisés Caicedo. The transfers shocked the market in terms of headline value but both of these signings were aged 21 when the transfers happened, leaving plenty of room for them to rise in value while tying them in for an entire potentially formative decade. The true wage cost, less of an indicator of health in accounts terms but perhaps the better indicator of it overall, has remained below that of competitors Manchester United and Liverpool’s. On the surface it reads as irresponsible expenditure but it is actually an extremely considered utilization of capital with clear underlying rationale. The signings in the criticism warrant closer examination too. Robert Sánchez, signed from Brighton for £27 million, was an argumentative signing based on his third-choice status in his final campaign. But he had experience in the Premier League along with physical dominance and domestic status when Chelsea had recently released Édouard Mendy and Kepa Arrizabalaga. Depending solely on an unproven reserve like Petrovic from the beginning of rebuilding would have involved an enormous risk. As for Marc Cucurella, it is safe to say Chelsea paid over the odds with multiple Manchester City interest contributing to the premium cost. But his versatility and game knowledge in systems that make high pressing essential along with flexibility of positioning in systems that value versatility have begun to show in the game under Mauricio Pochettino, especially in the closing stages of the 2023–24 campaign. Passing judgement on this signing as a failure based on initial performances is informative but lacks the development viewpoint. The most misrepresented transfer could be that of Moisés Caicedo. The story that Chelsea messed up his signing by allowing the price to inflate overlooks the market dynamics of the day. Brighton played the negotiations masterfully in playing on Liverpool’s interest to be able to secure a higher price for him. In this regard, Chelsea didn’t blink—they tied the player down to an extended deal and signed one of the most finished young defensive midfielders in world football. As the campaign unfolded, Caicedo showed exactly why he was so highly regarded, playing with great ball recovery, positional awareness, and play in transition. Even at £115 million, the expense will be worth it in the end, especially considering the limited supply of great defensive midfielders in the marketplace Another acquisition widely misunderstood is that of Enzo Fernández. Critics labeled his signing an emotional reaction to his performances in the World Cup, an status symbol rather than an footballing imperative. The analysis neglects to consider the pressing need Chelsea had for a deeper playmaker with the ability to dictate the game's pace and connect defense with attack. Enzo has since fulfilled that role since arriving, providing discipline and perspective to an previously aimless midfield. His technical ceiling, maturity level, and overall age all accompany the extended gamble Chelsea took on him. Similarly, Cole Palmer’s signing from Manchester City was viewed back then as an example of desperation shopping. Now it is every bit as acclaimed as one of the shrewdest pieces of business of the campaign. Palmer proved himself the club’s top producer of goals, providing guile, invention, and self-assurance way above his years. This was no fluke but the work of concerted scouting and an ability to recognize buried talent from opposing youth outfits. Something that critics fail to notice is that Chelsea's recruitment process is symptomatic of an overall shift in operating philosophy. The club is constructing not merely an army of players but an in-house football ecosystem. The recruitment of technical directors such as Monaco's Laurence Stewart and Brighton's Paul Winstanley supports this assertion. Chelsea is not merely responding to market opportunities—it is creating an in-house intelligence unit, using data analytics, investing in development pipelines such as RC Strasbourg as its feeder club. The mindset is everything in this case: establishing a club that can self-finance its competitiveness internally through development, shrewd signings, and commercial expansion. This is the kind of radical restructure that others such as Manchester City and Red Bull undertook ten years ago—but Chelsea is trying to do it in less than half the tenure. The fuss over the goalkeeper situation, specifically Petrovic and the potential treatment of Courtois, distorts the timeline of development of the players as well. Courtois had two full seasons on loan with Atlético Madrid before Chelsea’s number one status was bestowed upon him. Petrovic's rise in the space of half of a season cannot be directly compared. While he has played well, making him the immediate starter over either of the available goalkeepers would have disregarded all past precedent and cautionary principle. The coaching staff's decision in this regard is reflective of rational risk management rather than distrust or failure of insight. Ultimately, Chelsea’s recruitment since 2022 has been bold, costly, and controversial—but not inept. It is the manifestation of the evolution of modern football in which data-led scouting, long-term fiscal modelling, and valuation of the asset called the player determine success over media narrative or reactionary opinion. The apparent disorder is merely the turbulence of revolution. Mistakes might well have been committed—as with any large-scale organisational revolution—but the overall vision is apparent, and some of the perceived gambles already paying dividends. By 2026, Chelsea could be the Benchmark Club of European football, not in defiance of its recruitment policy but because of it. Just because you do not agree with the recruitment, it does not mean it is not the path chosen by our owners. They have a vision, 1.5B into the vision is too late to turn back on. The fate of the club is already sealed for the next 10 years. This is the way we are going, like it or not.

1 hour ago, Clown Lake said:

That was strictly PSR move. I would not think its the end

Chelsea's transition out of the Abramovich period was never going to be an iteration of the past. The team left in Clearlake's wake was bloated, splintered, and full of players whose value had leveled off or decreased. Older stalwarts such as César Azpilicueta, Jorginho, and Aubameyang embodied the remnants of a short-term paradigm, while young hopefuls such as Pulisic and Ziyech had failed to become the high-end contributors projected of them. They were high-paid on long contracts to boot, making it hard to shift them on. In this context, the new ownership group was tasked with revitalizing the roster, reducing the average age, and building for sustainable futures along the way. The resulting strategy was one resembling a classical venture capital strategy—high initial investment in undervalued or developing assets, emphasizing long-term upside, and tolerance of near-term volatility. At the heart of this strategy is Chelsea’s creative use of amortized contracts to avoid violating Financial Fair Play rules. In signing players to seven- or eight-year contracts, the club was able to amortize the high cost of transfer fees over numerous seasons in its accounts. The case of Enzo Fernández’s £106 million transfer is commonly referred to as an overpay. When translated to annual cost in accounts terms, he is closer to costing the club around £12.5 million—a figure well within the club’s model. The same reasoning can be used with regard to the £115 million spent on Moisés Caicedo. The transfers shocked the market in terms of headline value but both of these signings were aged 21 when the transfers happened, leaving plenty of room for them to rise in value while tying them in for an entire potentially formative decade. The true wage cost, less of an indicator of health in accounts terms but perhaps the better indicator of it overall, has remained below that of competitors Manchester United and Liverpool’s. On the surface it reads as irresponsible expenditure but it is actually an extremely considered utilization of capital with clear underlying rationale. The signings in the criticism warrant closer examination too. Robert Sánchez, signed from Brighton for £27 million, was an argumentative signing based on his third-choice status in his final campaign. But he had experience in the Premier League along with physical dominance and domestic status when Chelsea had recently released Édouard Mendy and Kepa Arrizabalaga. Depending solely on an unproven reserve like Petrovic from the beginning of rebuilding would have involved an enormous risk. As for Marc Cucurella, it is safe to say Chelsea paid over the odds with multiple Manchester City interest contributing to the premium cost. But his versatility and game knowledge in systems that make high pressing essential along with flexibility of positioning in systems that value versatility have begun to show in the game under Mauricio Pochettino, especially in the closing stages of the 2023–24 campaign. Passing judgement on this signing as a failure based on initial performances is informative but lacks the development viewpoint. The most misrepresented transfer could be that of Moisés Caicedo. The story that Chelsea messed up his signing by allowing the price to inflate overlooks the market dynamics of the day. Brighton played the negotiations masterfully in playing on Liverpool’s interest to be able to secure a higher price for him. In this regard, Chelsea didn’t blink—they tied the player down to an extended deal and signed one of the most finished young defensive midfielders in world football. As the campaign unfolded, Caicedo showed exactly why he was so highly regarded, playing with great ball recovery, positional awareness, and play in transition. Even at £115 million, the expense will be worth it in the end, especially considering the limited supply of great defensive midfielders in the marketplace Another acquisition widely misunderstood is that of Enzo Fernández. Critics labeled his signing an emotional reaction to his performances in the World Cup, an status symbol rather than an footballing imperative. The analysis neglects to consider the pressing need Chelsea had for a deeper playmaker with the ability to dictate the game's pace and connect defense with attack. Enzo has since fulfilled that role since arriving, providing discipline and perspective to an previously aimless midfield. His technical ceiling, maturity level, and overall age all accompany the extended gamble Chelsea took on him. Similarly, Cole Palmer’s signing from Manchester City was viewed back then as an example of desperation shopping. Now it is every bit as acclaimed as one of the shrewdest pieces of business of the campaign. Palmer proved himself the club’s top producer of goals, providing guile, invention, and self-assurance way above his years. This was no fluke but the work of concerted scouting and an ability to recognize buried talent from opposing youth outfits. Something that critics fail to notice is that Chelsea's recruitment process is symptomatic of an overall shift in operating philosophy. The club is constructing not merely an army of players but an in-house football ecosystem. The recruitment of technical directors such as Monaco's Laurence Stewart and Brighton's Paul Winstanley supports this assertion. Chelsea is not merely responding to market opportunities—it is creating an in-house intelligence unit, using data analytics, investing in development pipelines such as RC Strasbourg as its feeder club. The mindset is everything in this case: establishing a club that can self-finance its competitiveness internally through development, shrewd signings, and commercial expansion. This is the kind of radical restructure that others such as Manchester City and Red Bull undertook ten years ago—but Chelsea is trying to do it in less than half the tenure. The fuss over the goalkeeper situation, specifically Petrovic and the potential treatment of Courtois, distorts the timeline of development of the players as well. Courtois had two full seasons on loan with Atlético Madrid before Chelsea’s number one status was bestowed upon him. Petrovic's rise in the space of half of a season cannot be directly compared. While he has played well, making him the immediate starter over either of the available goalkeepers would have disregarded all past precedent and cautionary principle. The coaching staff's decision in this regard is reflective of rational risk management rather than distrust or failure of insight. Ultimately, Chelsea’s recruitment since 2022 has been bold, costly, and controversial—but not inept. It is the manifestation of the evolution of modern football in which data-led scouting, long-term fiscal modelling, and valuation of the asset called the player determine success over media narrative or reactionary opinion. The apparent disorder is merely the turbulence of revolution. Mistakes might well have been committed—as with any large-scale organisational revolution—but the overall vision is apparent, and some of the perceived gambles already paying dividends. By 2026, Chelsea could be the Benchmark Club of European football, not in defiance of its recruitment policy but because of it. Just because you do not agree with the recruitment, it does not mean it is not the path chosen by our owners. They have a vision, 1.5B into the vision is too late to turn back on. The fate of the club is already sealed for the next 10 years. This is the way we are going, like it or not.

Sorry but that is the biggest load of old pish I've ever read on here.

ChatGPT write it for you ?

16 minutes ago, Sexyfootball said:

ChatGPT write it for you ?

GPT says yes, the overall majority of it!

1 hour ago, Clown Lake said:

That was strictly PSR move. I would not think its the end

Chelsea's transition out of the Abramovich period was never going to be an iteration of the past. The team left in Clearlake's wake was bloated, splintered, and full of players whose value had leveled off or decreased. Older stalwarts such as César Azpilicueta, Jorginho, and Aubameyang embodied the remnants of a short-term paradigm, while young hopefuls such as Pulisic and Ziyech had failed to become the high-end contributors projected of them. They were high-paid on long contracts to boot, making it hard to shift them on. In this context, the new ownership group was tasked with revitalizing the roster, reducing the average age, and building for sustainable futures along the way. The resulting strategy was one resembling a classical venture capital strategy—high initial investment in undervalued or developing assets, emphasizing long-term upside, and tolerance of near-term volatility. At the heart of this strategy is Chelsea’s creative use of amortized contracts to avoid violating Financial Fair Play rules. In signing players to seven- or eight-year contracts, the club was able to amortize the high cost of transfer fees over numerous seasons in its accounts. The case of Enzo Fernández’s £106 million transfer is commonly referred to as an overpay. When translated to annual cost in accounts terms, he is closer to costing the club around £12.5 million—a figure well within the club’s model. The same reasoning can be used with regard to the £115 million spent on Moisés Caicedo. The transfers shocked the market in terms of headline value but both of these signings were aged 21 when the transfers happened, leaving plenty of room for them to rise in value while tying them in for an entire potentially formative decade. The true wage cost, less of an indicator of health in accounts terms but perhaps the better indicator of it overall, has remained below that of competitors Manchester United and Liverpool’s. On the surface it reads as irresponsible expenditure but it is actually an extremely considered utilization of capital with clear underlying rationale. The signings in the criticism warrant closer examination too. Robert Sánchez, signed from Brighton for £27 million, was an argumentative signing based on his third-choice status in his final campaign. But he had experience in the Premier League along with physical dominance and domestic status when Chelsea had recently released Édouard Mendy and Kepa Arrizabalaga. Depending solely on an unproven reserve like Petrovic from the beginning of rebuilding would have involved an enormous risk. As for Marc Cucurella, it is safe to say Chelsea paid over the odds with multiple Manchester City interest contributing to the premium cost. But his versatility and game knowledge in systems that make high pressing essential along with flexibility of positioning in systems that value versatility have begun to show in the game under Mauricio Pochettino, especially in the closing stages of the 2023–24 campaign. Passing judgement on this signing as a failure based on initial performances is informative but lacks the development viewpoint. The most misrepresented transfer could be that of Moisés Caicedo. The story that Chelsea messed up his signing by allowing the price to inflate overlooks the market dynamics of the day. Brighton played the negotiations masterfully in playing on Liverpool’s interest to be able to secure a higher price for him. In this regard, Chelsea didn’t blink—they tied the player down to an extended deal and signed one of the most finished young defensive midfielders in world football. As the campaign unfolded, Caicedo showed exactly why he was so highly regarded, playing with great ball recovery, positional awareness, and play in transition. Even at £115 million, the expense will be worth it in the end, especially considering the limited supply of great defensive midfielders in the marketplace Another acquisition widely misunderstood is that of Enzo Fernández. Critics labeled his signing an emotional reaction to his performances in the World Cup, an status symbol rather than an footballing imperative. The analysis neglects to consider the pressing need Chelsea had for a deeper playmaker with the ability to dictate the game's pace and connect defense with attack. Enzo has since fulfilled that role since arriving, providing discipline and perspective to an previously aimless midfield. His technical ceiling, maturity level, and overall age all accompany the extended gamble Chelsea took on him. Similarly, Cole Palmer’s signing from Manchester City was viewed back then as an example of desperation shopping. Now it is every bit as acclaimed as one of the shrewdest pieces of business of the campaign. Palmer proved himself the club’s top producer of goals, providing guile, invention, and self-assurance way above his years. This was no fluke but the work of concerted scouting and an ability to recognize buried talent from opposing youth outfits. Something that critics fail to notice is that Chelsea's recruitment process is symptomatic of an overall shift in operating philosophy. The club is constructing not merely an army of players but an in-house football ecosystem. The recruitment of technical directors such as Monaco's Laurence Stewart and Brighton's Paul Winstanley supports this assertion. Chelsea is not merely responding to market opportunities—it is creating an in-house intelligence unit, using data analytics, investing in development pipelines such as RC Strasbourg as its feeder club. The mindset is everything in this case: establishing a club that can self-finance its competitiveness internally through development, shrewd signings, and commercial expansion. This is the kind of radical restructure that others such as Manchester City and Red Bull undertook ten years ago—but Chelsea is trying to do it in less than half the tenure. The fuss over the goalkeeper situation, specifically Petrovic and the potential treatment of Courtois, distorts the timeline of development of the players as well. Courtois had two full seasons on loan with Atlético Madrid before Chelsea’s number one status was bestowed upon him. Petrovic's rise in the space of half of a season cannot be directly compared. While he has played well, making him the immediate starter over either of the available goalkeepers would have disregarded all past precedent and cautionary principle. The coaching staff's decision in this regard is reflective of rational risk management rather than distrust or failure of insight. Ultimately, Chelsea’s recruitment since 2022 has been bold, costly, and controversial—but not inept. It is the manifestation of the evolution of modern football in which data-led scouting, long-term fiscal modelling, and valuation of the asset called the player determine success over media narrative or reactionary opinion. The apparent disorder is merely the turbulence of revolution. Mistakes might well have been committed—as with any large-scale organisational revolution—but the overall vision is apparent, and some of the perceived gambles already paying dividends. By 2026, Chelsea could be the Benchmark Club of European football, not in defiance of its recruitment policy but because of it. Just because you do not agree with the recruitment, it does not mean it is not the path chosen by our owners. They have a vision, 1.5B into the vision is too late to turn back on. The fate of the club is already sealed for the next 10 years. This is the way we are going, like it or not.

The way you write makes you sound like a journalist but your username suggests a mockery of the ownership. Pick a lane bro.

Fact of the matter is, it's not just about the bigger signings like Enzo, Caicedo etc.

It's stuff like not reassuring Petrovic and disrespecting him by allowing stuff like Maignan to fuel the narrative. It's the links to Gittens when he's a version of Sancho that hasn't fully mature yet. It's the unnecessary hoarding of talent yet missing the mark with players like Vitinha, Doue, Olise.

Not every SD is perfect but signings should follow a certain type of framework that's not as vague as "Player is XX age with XX worth of profits, can be sold for XX after XX years". It may not be the cass that's going on in the boardroom but the optics so far based on actions the club has undertaken points us to it.

4 hours ago, Sexyfootball said:

Sorry but that is the biggest load of old pish I've ever read on here.

ChatGPT write it for you ?

4 hours ago, Mod said:

GPT says yes, the overall majority of it!

Excuse me...?

Well thought out, frustrated posts are GPT now? Heres a scan for you if it was A.I or not.....

Shocking honestly.

4 hours ago, Deino said:

The way you write makes you sound like a journalist but your username suggests a mockery of the ownership. Pick a lane bro.

Fact of the matter is, it's not just about the bigger signings like Enzo, Caicedo etc.

It's stuff like not reassuring Petrovic and disrespecting him by allowing stuff like Maignan to fuel the narrative. It's the links to Gittens when he's a version of Sancho that hasn't fully mature yet. It's the unnecessary hoarding of talent yet missing the mark with players like Vitinha, Doue, Olise.

Not every SD is perfect but signings should follow a certain type of framework that's not as vague as "Player is XX age with XX worth of profits, can be sold for XX after XX years". It may not be the cass that's going on in the boardroom but the optics so far based on actions the club has undertaken points us to it.

Unsure if you are being serious or sarcastic. If you are serious, please take a long minute.

19 hours ago, terraloon said:

They don’t see it as throwing money away on youngsters they, the owners, are gambling that these type of players will turnout to be first team players or in total will generate transfer income far in excess of what is being paid out

How though? How do we make money far in excess of what we paid on the majority of these young players? We already paid way over what they were worth when we signed them, and then you factor in their wages, how on earth do we make that kind of money back and then make big profits from it? Badiashile for example, if we sold him now, we wouldn't make a profit on him, I doubt we could even make the money back that we paid for him.

12 minutes ago, Scott Harris said:

How though? How do we make money far in excess of what we paid on the majority of these young players? We already paid way over what they were worth when we signed them, and then you factor in their wages, how on earth do we make that kind of money back and then make big profits from it? Badiashile for example, if we sold him now, we wouldn't make a profit on him, I doubt we could even make the money back that we paid for him.

The goal is not about making big profit on player trading. I think Eghbali/Todd said the goal is to be competitive while paying lower salary and not paying big tranfer fee every season.

So let's say you need an attacker.

Scenario 1, you sign 60 m attacker. If that player flop like Sancho, you basically lose that 60 m+you need to sign another attacker.

Scenario 2, you sign three 20 m player. Even if 2 player flop big time, you can probably still sell them for 15 total and let's say one is successful and turn out to be 40m attacker, you have 40m attacker + 15 m cash vs 0 in scenario 1.

9 hours ago, Clown Lake said:

That was strictly PSR move. I would not think its the end

Chelsea's transition out of the Abramovich period was never going to be an iteration of the past. The team left in Clearlake's wake was bloated, splintered, and full of players whose value had leveled off or decreased. Older stalwarts such as César Azpilicueta, Jorginho, and Aubameyang embodied the remnants of a short-term paradigm, while young hopefuls such as Pulisic and Ziyech had failed to become the high-end contributors projected of them. They were high-paid on long contracts to boot, making it hard to shift them on. In this context, the new ownership group was tasked with revitalizing the roster, reducing the average age, and building for sustainable futures along the way. The resulting strategy was one resembling a classical venture capital strategy—high initial investment in undervalued or developing assets, emphasizing long-term upside, and tolerance of near-term volatility. At the heart of this strategy is Chelsea’s creative use of amortized contracts to avoid violating Financial Fair Play rules. In signing players to seven- or eight-year contracts, the club was able to amortize the high cost of transfer fees over numerous seasons in its accounts. The case of Enzo Fernández’s £106 million transfer is commonly referred to as an overpay. When translated to annual cost in accounts terms, he is closer to costing the club around £12.5 million—a figure well within the club’s model. The same reasoning can be used with regard to the £115 million spent on Moisés Caicedo. The transfers shocked the market in terms of headline value but both of these signings were aged 21 when the transfers happened, leaving plenty of room for them to rise in value while tying them in for an entire potentially formative decade. The true wage cost, less of an indicator of health in accounts terms but perhaps the better indicator of it overall, has remained below that of competitors Manchester United and Liverpool’s. On the surface it reads as irresponsible expenditure but it is actually an extremely considered utilization of capital with clear underlying rationale. The signings in the criticism warrant closer examination too. Robert Sánchez, signed from Brighton for £27 million, was an argumentative signing based on his third-choice status in his final campaign. But he had experience in the Premier League along with physical dominance and domestic status when Chelsea had recently released Édouard Mendy and Kepa Arrizabalaga. Depending solely on an unproven reserve like Petrovic from the beginning of rebuilding would have involved an enormous risk. As for Marc Cucurella, it is safe to say Chelsea paid over the odds with multiple Manchester City interest contributing to the premium cost. But his versatility and game knowledge in systems that make high pressing essential along with flexibility of positioning in systems that value versatility have begun to show in the game under Mauricio Pochettino, especially in the closing stages of the 2023–24 campaign. Passing judgement on this signing as a failure based on initial performances is informative but lacks the development viewpoint. The most misrepresented transfer could be that of Moisés Caicedo. The story that Chelsea messed up his signing by allowing the price to inflate overlooks the market dynamics of the day. Brighton played the negotiations masterfully in playing on Liverpool’s interest to be able to secure a higher price for him. In this regard, Chelsea didn’t blink—they tied the player down to an extended deal and signed one of the most finished young defensive midfielders in world football. As the campaign unfolded, Caicedo showed exactly why he was so highly regarded, playing with great ball recovery, positional awareness, and play in transition. Even at £115 million, the expense will be worth it in the end, especially considering the limited supply of great defensive midfielders in the marketplace Another acquisition widely misunderstood is that of Enzo Fernández. Critics labeled his signing an emotional reaction to his performances in the World Cup, an status symbol rather than an footballing imperative. The analysis neglects to consider the pressing need Chelsea had for a deeper playmaker with the ability to dictate the game's pace and connect defense with attack. Enzo has since fulfilled that role since arriving, providing discipline and perspective to an previously aimless midfield. His technical ceiling, maturity level, and overall age all accompany the extended gamble Chelsea took on him. Similarly, Cole Palmer’s signing from Manchester City was viewed back then as an example of desperation shopping. Now it is every bit as acclaimed as one of the shrewdest pieces of business of the campaign. Palmer proved himself the club’s top producer of goals, providing guile, invention, and self-assurance way above his years. This was no fluke but the work of concerted scouting and an ability to recognize buried talent from opposing youth outfits. Something that critics fail to notice is that Chelsea's recruitment process is symptomatic of an overall shift in operating philosophy. The club is constructing not merely an army of players but an in-house football ecosystem. The recruitment of technical directors such as Monaco's Laurence Stewart and Brighton's Paul Winstanley supports this assertion. Chelsea is not merely responding to market opportunities—it is creating an in-house intelligence unit, using data analytics, investing in development pipelines such as RC Strasbourg as its feeder club. The mindset is everything in this case: establishing a club that can self-finance its competitiveness internally through development, shrewd signings, and commercial expansion. This is the kind of radical restructure that others such as Manchester City and Red Bull undertook ten years ago—but Chelsea is trying to do it in less than half the tenure. The fuss over the goalkeeper situation, specifically Petrovic and the potential treatment of Courtois, distorts the timeline of development of the players as well. Courtois had two full seasons on loan with Atlético Madrid before Chelsea’s number one status was bestowed upon him. Petrovic's rise in the space of half of a season cannot be directly compared. While he has played well, making him the immediate starter over either of the available goalkeepers would have disregarded all past precedent and cautionary principle. The coaching staff's decision in this regard is reflective of rational risk management rather than distrust or failure of insight. Ultimately, Chelsea’s recruitment since 2022 has been bold, costly, and controversial—but not inept. It is the manifestation of the evolution of modern football in which data-led scouting, long-term fiscal modelling, and valuation of the asset called the player determine success over media narrative or reactionary opinion. The apparent disorder is merely the turbulence of revolution. Mistakes might well have been committed—as with any large-scale organisational revolution—but the overall vision is apparent, and some of the perceived gambles already paying dividends. By 2026, Chelsea could be the Benchmark Club of European football, not in defiance of its recruitment policy but because of it. Just because you do not agree with the recruitment, it does not mean it is not the path chosen by our owners. They have a vision, 1.5B into the vision is too late to turn back on. The fate of the club is already sealed for the next 10 years. This is the way we are going, like it or not.

Completely derailing and ruining a young players career is just a PSR move to cover our own financial mistakes, what a wonderful institution we are.

I’m currently lay by a pool so not willing to read that essay on my phone, I’ll reply later when I’m back on my MacBook but I can already tell it’s going to be a hell of a lot of bo**ocks.

1 hour ago, Ukraine Bolt said:

Completely derailing and ruining a young players career is just a PSR move to cover our own financial mistakes, what a wonderful institution we are.

I’m currently lay by a pool so not willing to read that essay on my phone, I’ll reply later when I’m back on my MacBook but I can already tell it’s going to be a hell of a lot of bo**ocks.

As are most of your responses!

If you want to get into ruining a young players career then the place realistically to start is a club academy

1 hour ago, terraloon said:

As are most of your responses!

If you want to get into ruining a young players career then the place realistically to start is a club academy

A man should know throw stones in glass houses.

You’re right, these new owners really have ruined our academy. We’d just started to reap the rewards of 20 years of hard work, building one of the best academies in the world. We’d had a squad filled with academy graduates and were producing genuinely world class players.

Sadly the new ownership see this as nothing more than an income stream these days to patch up their poor transfer strategy with ‘pure profit’.

Third time lucky and they might finally be able to chop Chalobah this transfer window like they’re so desperate to do so they can sign another Badiashile or Disasi and amortise the fee! Was your best friend director the one that has a hard on for all of the Monaco duds?

2 hours ago, Bob stark said:

The goal is not about making big profit on player trading. I think Eghbali/Todd said the goal is to be competitive while paying lower salary and not paying big tranfer fee every season.

So let's say you need an attacker.

Scenario 1, you sign 60 m attacker. If that player flop like Sancho, you basically lose that 60 m+you need to sign another attacker.

Scenario 2, you sign three 20 m player. Even if 2 player flop big time, you can probably still sell them for 15 total and let's say one is successful and turn out to be 40m attacker, you have 40m attacker + 15 m cash vs 0 in scenario 1.

Bohley said something the other day which I thought was quite revealing . It was along the lines that the bulk of the investment was near enough done.

Now you could read that as being no more transfer expense but I don’t think he was suggesting that the club won’t be buying first team players I believe it’s more to do with the funds that will be set aside to fund younger purchase. It’s not that there won’t be more incomings it’s more to do with that part of the “ project” will be self funding so your scenario 2 is probably more to the objective

Clown Lakes contribution yesterday is perhaps the most comprehensive contribution as to the reality of where the club was at the time of the takeover and indeed giving an insight why certain decisions were taken. The comment around the time lines was particularly interesting.

Many of the fees quoted on sites such as transfer market aren’t what has been paid but the potential once add ons are achieved. If you look at the accounts and pay particular attention to financial activity post the accounting period it over tells a far different story to the inflated numbers you get from in verified sites

1 hour ago, Ukraine Bolt said:

A man should know throw stones in glass houses.

You’re right, these new owners really have ruined our academy. We’d just started to reap the rewards of 20 years of hard work, building one of the best academies in the world. We’d had a squad filled with academy graduates and were producing genuinely world class players.

Sadly the new ownership see this as nothing more than an income stream these days to patch up their poor transfer strategy with ‘pure profit’.

Third time lucky and they might finally be able to chop Chalobah this transfer window like they’re so desperate to do so they can sign another Badiashile or Disasi and amortise the fee! Was your best friend director the one that has a hard on for all of the Monaco duds?

Well stop throwing them then !

I talk in general about academics and not just specifically about Chelsea. As for having a squad full of academy products not sure that we have ever had more in the squad post 2000 than last season .

Each seasons end dozens of clubs academy players are discarded they are the real victims in the cut throat world of football far less so than the players that move for a fee

Interesting as it is that I do in fact know one of our directors your obsession with him being a mate of mine, which I have never claimed, is weird.

Edited June 14, 20251 yr by terraloon

14 minutes ago, terraloon said:

Bohley said something the other day which I thought was quite revealing . It was along the lines that the bulk of the investment was near enough done.

Now you could read that as being no more transfer expense but I don’t think he was suggesting that the club won’t be buying first team players I believe it’s more to do with the funds that will be set aside to fund younger purchase. It’s not that there won’t be more incomings it’s more to do with that part of the “ project” will be self funding so your scenario 2 is probably more to the objective

Clown Lakes contribution yesterday is perhaps the most comprehensive contribution as to the reality of where the club was at the time of the takeover and indeed giving an insight why certain decisions were taken. The comment around the time lines was particularly interesting.

Many of the fees quoted on sites such as transfer market aren’t what has been paid but the potential once add ons are achieved. If you look at the accounts and pay particular attention to financial activity post the accounting period it over tells a far different story to the inflated numbers you get from in verified sites

Well stop throwing them then !

I talk in general about academics and not just specifically about Chelsea. As for having a squad full of academy products not sure that we have ever had more in the squad post 2000 than last season .

Each seasons end dozens of clubs academy players are discarded they are the real victims in the cut throat world of football far less so than the players that move for a fee

Interesting as it is that I do in fact know one of our directors your obsession with him being a mate of mine, which I have never claimed, is weird.

So if he’s not your mate you don’t actually know him then. You’ve bumped into him at a restaurant and now claiming to know him off a one off meeting. It’s embarrassing, stop it.

3 hours ago, Ukraine Bolt said:

A man should know throw stones in glass houses.

You’re right, these new owners really have ruined our academy. We’d just started to reap the rewards of 20 years of hard work, building one of the best academies in the world. We’d had a squad filled with academy graduates and were producing genuinely world class players.

Sadly the new ownership see this as nothing more than an income stream these days to patch up their poor transfer strategy with ‘pure profit’.

Third time lucky and they might finally be able to chop Chalobah this transfer window like they’re so desperate to do so they can sign another Badiashile or Disasi and amortise the fee! Was your best friend director the one that has a hard on for all of the Monaco duds?

I really like your posts. They are reasoned valid arguments generally backed by solid facts. I just wish that you wouldn't include personal digs at other posters that you are responding to. I think it undermines your responses and can lead threads down an unnecessary personal path. More importantly, I want to like the majority of your posts but in doing so I don't want to be seen to be validating digs at other posters.

Other than that I think a lot of what you post is pretty much bang on.

Edited June 14, 20251 yr by WhiteWall

32 minutes ago, WhiteWall said:

I really like your posts. They are reasoned valid arguments generally backed by solid facts. I just wish that you wouldn't include personal digs at other posters that you are responding to. I think it undermines your responses and can lead threads down an unnecessary personal path. More importantly, I want to like the majority of your posts but in doing so I don't want to be seen to be validating digs at other posters.

Other than that I think a lot of what you post is pretty much bang on.

I appreciate your comment and will take it into consideration.

If someone wants to bring up that they're close with a director of the club, something like that is unlikely to be brushed under the carpet.

16 hours ago, Clown Lake said:

That was strictly PSR move. I would not think its the end

Chelsea's transition out of the Abramovich period was never going to be an iteration of the past. The team left in Clearlake's wake was bloated, splintered, and full of players whose value had leveled off or decreased. Older stalwarts such as César Azpilicueta, Jorginho, and Aubameyang embodied the remnants of a short-term paradigm, while young hopefuls such as Pulisic and Ziyech had failed to become the high-end contributors projected of them. They were high-paid on long contracts to boot, making it hard to shift them on. In this context, the new ownership group was tasked with revitalizing the roster, reducing the average age, and building for sustainable futures along the way. The resulting strategy was one resembling a classical venture capital strategy—high initial investment in undervalued or developing assets, emphasizing long-term upside, and tolerance of near-term volatility. At the heart of this strategy is Chelsea’s creative use of amortized contracts to avoid violating Financial Fair Play rules. In signing players to seven- or eight-year contracts, the club was able to amortize the high cost of transfer fees over numerous seasons in its accounts. The case of Enzo Fernández’s £106 million transfer is commonly referred to as an overpay. When translated to annual cost in accounts terms, he is closer to costing the club around £12.5 million—a figure well within the club’s model. The same reasoning can be used with regard to the £115 million spent on Moisés Caicedo. The transfers shocked the market in terms of headline value but both of these signings were aged 21 when the transfers happened, leaving plenty of room for them to rise in value while tying them in for an entire potentially formative decade. The true wage cost, less of an indicator of health in accounts terms but perhaps the better indicator of it overall, has remained below that of competitors Manchester United and Liverpool’s. On the surface it reads as irresponsible expenditure but it is actually an extremely considered utilization of capital with clear underlying rationale. The signings in the criticism warrant closer examination too. Robert Sánchez, signed from Brighton for £27 million, was an argumentative signing based on his third-choice status in his final campaign. But he had experience in the Premier League along with physical dominance and domestic status when Chelsea had recently released Édouard Mendy and Kepa Arrizabalaga. Depending solely on an unproven reserve like Petrovic from the beginning of rebuilding would have involved an enormous risk. As for Marc Cucurella, it is safe to say Chelsea paid over the odds with multiple Manchester City interest contributing to the premium cost. But his versatility and game knowledge in systems that make high pressing essential along with flexibility of positioning in systems that value versatility have begun to show in the game under Mauricio Pochettino, especially in the closing stages of the 2023–24 campaign. Passing judgement on this signing as a failure based on initial performances is informative but lacks the development viewpoint. The most misrepresented transfer could be that of Moisés Caicedo. The story that Chelsea messed up his signing by allowing the price to inflate overlooks the market dynamics of the day. Brighton played the negotiations masterfully in playing on Liverpool’s interest to be able to secure a higher price for him. In this regard, Chelsea didn’t blink—they tied the player down to an extended deal and signed one of the most finished young defensive midfielders in world football. As the campaign unfolded, Caicedo showed exactly why he was so highly regarded, playing with great ball recovery, positional awareness, and play in transition. Even at £115 million, the expense will be worth it in the end, especially considering the limited supply of great defensive midfielders in the marketplace Another acquisition widely misunderstood is that of Enzo Fernández. Critics labeled his signing an emotional reaction to his performances in the World Cup, an status symbol rather than an footballing imperative. The analysis neglects to consider the pressing need Chelsea had for a deeper playmaker with the ability to dictate the game's pace and connect defense with attack. Enzo has since fulfilled that role since arriving, providing discipline and perspective to an previously aimless midfield. His technical ceiling, maturity level, and overall age all accompany the extended gamble Chelsea took on him. Similarly, Cole Palmer’s signing from Manchester City was viewed back then as an example of desperation shopping. Now it is every bit as acclaimed as one of the shrewdest pieces of business of the campaign. Palmer proved himself the club’s top producer of goals, providing guile, invention, and self-assurance way above his years. This was no fluke but the work of concerted scouting and an ability to recognize buried talent from opposing youth outfits. Something that critics fail to notice is that Chelsea's recruitment process is symptomatic of an overall shift in operating philosophy. The club is constructing not merely an army of players but an in-house football ecosystem. The recruitment of technical directors such as Monaco's Laurence Stewart and Brighton's Paul Winstanley supports this assertion. Chelsea is not merely responding to market opportunities—it is creating an in-house intelligence unit, using data analytics, investing in development pipelines such as RC Strasbourg as its feeder club. The mindset is everything in this case: establishing a club that can self-finance its competitiveness internally through development, shrewd signings, and commercial expansion. This is the kind of radical restructure that others such as Manchester City and Red Bull undertook ten years ago—but Chelsea is trying to do it in less than half the tenure. The fuss over the goalkeeper situation, specifically Petrovic and the potential treatment of Courtois, distorts the timeline of development of the players as well. Courtois had two full seasons on loan with Atlético Madrid before Chelsea’s number one status was bestowed upon him. Petrovic's rise in the space of half of a season cannot be directly compared. While he has played well, making him the immediate starter over either of the available goalkeepers would have disregarded all past precedent and cautionary principle. The coaching staff's decision in this regard is reflective of rational risk management rather than distrust or failure of insight. Ultimately, Chelsea’s recruitment since 2022 has been bold, costly, and controversial—but not inept. It is the manifestation of the evolution of modern football in which data-led scouting, long-term fiscal modelling, and valuation of the asset called the player determine success over media narrative or reactionary opinion. The apparent disorder is merely the turbulence of revolution. Mistakes might well have been committed—as with any large-scale organisational revolution—but the overall vision is apparent, and some of the perceived gambles already paying dividends. By 2026, Chelsea could be the Benchmark Club of European football, not in defiance of its recruitment policy but because of it. Just because you do not agree with the recruitment, it does not mean it is not the path chosen by our owners. They have a vision, 1.5B into the vision is too late to turn back on. The fate of the club is already sealed for the next 10 years. This is the way we are going, like it or not.

I really can't be arsed to break this down so i'll reply to key talking points in bullet points.

• the Roman-era squad was bloated. If it was bloated back then, we must be close to erupting at this point. Not sure how Clearlake have improved this, in fact quite the opposite.

• The squad was aged, however only a select few needed to be replaced to compete. You mention Auba, but he was signed by these owners. We could easily have got another couple of seasons out of Azpi. There was no need for such an abrupt upheaval.

• Funnily enough Pulisic would probably be our best winger if we still owned him.

• Yes - amortisation has been covered often. It still doesnt change the fact we paid £105m for a player worth about £60m at most. This isn't new ground we're breaking here.

• Defending the Sanchez signed, do i even bother to read on?

• We had the deal tied up long before Liverpool ever got involved, we had our pants pulled down and had to swing our bo**ocks at the last minute because our negotiators are idiots. Same with Enzo.

• Chelsea's need for a deep playmaker, good job every manager has him playing as a box crashing 8 because he's a liability anywhere near the defence. Worth every penny, definitely not a status symbol post world cup....

• Cole Palmer has worked out fabulously, incredible player. I think its disingenuous to pretend it wasn't pure luck that we ended up with him. We didn't even approach Man City until the very end of the window when we'd missed out on all of our targets that summer (common theme). Certainly no one could have predicted his meteoric rise and if they could why is this the only signing of this ilk that has worked in this fashion?

• We shouldn't be aiming to be a selling club with little success like Red Bull and Man City have always bought established winners, never this youth gamble. I don't have an issue with the multi-club model so i'm not sure why this is brought up either. Comparing apples and oranges here.

• The less i say about Winstanley and Stewart the better as i cba getting banned.

• I'm not sure if you followed Chelsea back then but everyone was aware of Courtois after his first season at Madrid and that he was good enough for us, however we had signed him up to a two year loan. Petrovic has been at Strasbourg for a year as well, not half a season. Making up things again. Your comments about the coaching staff not making someone number one because its dangerous is more bo**ocks after that's exactly what they did with Sanchez last summer and told Jorgensen he can have the cup games. They set a precedent last summer and now you're pretending that none of that happened, weird.

• Congrats to them for having a vision, that doesn't mean it's the right one. You all keep regurgitating this "they're here for a decade so get used to it" speech but that doesn't mean we should just accept it, what kind of boot licker opinion is that? Why would you just roll over and accept something you don't agree with?